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An Alternative Political Power Model, A Universal Mythos or A Meta-Narration: Global Governance?

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Abstract

This study includes some important notes and interpretations on multilevel governance arrangements and recent regulatory reforms in Turkey, where has been going through a dynamic transformation process in public life due to heavy internal and external pressures. In appearance, the elements of internal pressures can be listed as the two big economic crises in 1994 and 2001, the earthquake in 1999 and increasing demand of citizens for more democracy. In terms of external pressure, Turkey faces pressures stemming from being part of the international community. That means fulfillment of the requirements of IMF and World Bank and the process for European Union membership result in dynamic changes in Turkey. Opposite to that 'official' view, the main objective of this study is to understand the meaning of governance especially in the case of globalization and to evaluate the background practical and pragmatic concerns lying behind that concept. Considering the direct relations among governance arrangements and re-conceptualization and re-theorization of state, it is tried to be understood why the discourse of governance as a global reconstruction project emphasizes different issues in the different areas and regions of the world.

KEYWORDS: Global governance, regulatory reforms, globalization, neoliberalism

Alternatif Bir Siyasal İktidar Modeli, Evrensel Bir Mitos ya da Meta-Anlatı Olarak “Küresel Yönetişim”

Mehmet Gürsan Şenalp

Özet

Bu çalışma, son yıllarda hem iç hem de dış baskılar altında kamusal/yönetimsel süreçlerinde dinamik bir dönüşüm yaşayan Türkiye'nin, içinden geçmekte olduğu dönemde gerçekleştirmeye çalıştığı çok-düzeyle yönetim uygulamaları ve düzenleyici reformlar üzerine kimi değerlendirmeleri içermektedir. Ana-akım çözümler sözünü ettiğimiz iç baskıları 1994 ve 2001 yıllarında yaşanan ekonomik krizler, 1999 yılındaki büyük deprem ve yurttaşların giderek artan demokrasi talepleri olarak sıralarken; dış baskılar sözde “uluslararası toplum” bir parçası olmak kaygısıyla ilgili. Bunun anlamı IMF ve WB bir yanda Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik süreci diğer bir yanda ülkenin dönüşüm sürecinin baş aktörleri olmakta. Bu genel eğilimin tam tersine, bu çalışmanın temel amacı ise özellikle küreselleşme sürecinde yönetim kavramının anlamını/misyonunu ortaya koymak ve kavramın ardında yatan pratik amacın/ağlın etraflı bir değerlendirmesini yapabilmektir. Ayrıca, devleti yeniden tanımlayan ve yeniden kavramlaştıran niteliğinden yola çıkarak, küresel bir yeniden yapılanma projesi olarak beliren yönetişimin, hangi nedenlerle gelişmiş piyasa ekonomilerinde ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerde farklı farklı vurgularla ön plana çıktığının ipuçlarına ulaşılmaya çalışılacaktır.

ANAHTAR KELİMELELER: Küresel yönetişim, düzenleyici reformlar, küreselleşme, neoliberalizm

An Alternative Political Power Model, A Universal Mythos Or A Meta-Narration: Global Governance?¹

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1. INTRODUCTION

This study includes some important notes and interpretations on multilevel governance arrangements and recent regulatory reforms in Turkey, which has been going through a dynamic transformation process in public life due to heavy internal and external pressures. In appearance, the elements of internal pressures can be listed as the two big economic crises in 1994 and 2001, the earthquake in 1999 and increasing demand of citizens for more democracy. In terms of external pressure, Turkey faces pressures stemming from being part of the international community. That means fulfillment of the requirements of IMF and World Bank and the process for European Union membership result in dynamic changes in Turkey. Opposite to that “official” view, the main objective of this study is to understand the meaning of governance especially in the case of globalization and to evaluate the background practical and pragmatic concerns lying behind that concept. Considering the direct relations between governance arrangements and re-conceptualization and re-theorization of state, it is tried to be understood why the discourse of governance as a global reconstruction project emphasizes different issues in the different areas and regions of the world.

Although discourse of global governance includes some critical arguments about the real feature of interactions among the market, state and society, these so-called “critical” approaches never touches to the hegemonic character of the system which is reproduced again and again by the production of the unequal and un-humanistic relations. The approaches of global governance towards the notion of the state share many common points with the mainstream conventions that categorized state as a neutral body and completely leave it outside from the capital accumulation and redistribution process. According to that view, the state is conceived within an *ahistoric* context and considered as a powerful institution to protect the common interests of society as a whole. Within the discourse of governance, the state has no more been regarded against the market just as the rhetoric of the classical economy-politic suggests us (Tatar-Peker, 1996). In short, that point of view implies the state and market dichotomy has begun to loose its rational basis in recent years. Therefore, the term governance which is developed and supplied by some international financial/political institutions that are mainly the World Bank, IMF, OECD and WTO, represents a brilliant package of that strange transformation in the discourse of the mainstream social science disciplines such as international relations, economics, public administration and so on...

¹ This paper was also presented at the 7th Conference of the European Sociological Association, Torun-Poland, 9-12 September 2005.

2. GLOBALIZATION, IDEOLOGY AND THE HEGEMONY

One of the most diagnostic features of capitalism that strictly distinguishes it from the other social systems (formations) is its absolute success to separate the economic and the political within the society. It is possible to clarify the ideological functions of that distinction by referring Marx' own works. On the one hand, classical economy politic starts its analysis from distribution relations while regarding them within a social frame. However, in this perspective, the neoclassical view does not consider the production as a social process. On the other hand, Marx, in opposition of that neoclassical view, shows that the production itself is a "*social and physical process, and contradictory production of the value and use value*". In this manner, the process not only emphasizes the commodity production but also production and re-production of the social relations. In other words, Marx attempts to clarify the contradictory and political aspects of these social relations. This fact, basically, makes the exploitation in the economic field possible without coercion (Clarke, 1991: 75). That is to say, it will be useful to reconsider the concept of "hegemony" by following Gramscian point of view. In this manner, one can state that in developed and complex capitalist societies, the political power of ruling class does not rest exclusively or primarily on the control of the coercive apparatus of the state. This form of class rule, hegemony, is based on consent (Overbeek, 2004). Indeed, this hegemony is also based on individual rights, freedoms and the restrictions on the authority of political power through the representation mechanisms and laws (Wood, 1995). Thus, distinction of the economic and the political provides capitalism with an ability to (re)produce the hegemony of ruling class. That is true for the capitalist state, too (Clarke, 1991). In this perspective, it can be said that in Turkey, during the 1980s, a rapid *de-politization* of the economic field was realized. As a matter of fact, it goes hand in hand with the current global trends in the world.

In Yeldan's words, the post-1970s, that is, "*capitalism's second globalization era*" brought about some new perceptions about the notion of *sovereign state* (Yeldan, 2002: 15-19). The main reflections of that period, dominated by Reagan-Thatcher political line, on Turkey were the "January 24 Decisions" (1980), "September 12 Military Coup" (1980) and neoliberal Ozal Administrations (1983-1991). Particularly, with the liberalization of capital accounts in 1989, Turkey took an important step on the way of financial liberalization and integration process. As it is stated by many scholars, during that period the notion of the sovereignty of nation-state is replaced by the increasing influences of some transnational or supranational economic, financial and political institutions and organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Bank (WB) or European Union (EU) and the Free-Trade Area (FTA). Those institutions of the global capitalism can be regarded as the fundamental characteristics of globalization.

The central dynamic of the modern state was an authoritarian statism (...) "intensified state control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined with the radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called 'formal' liberties, whose reality is being discovered now that they are going overboard" (Poulantzas, 2000: 204).

Among the forms of state, as Poulantzas argues above, the “authoritarian statism” has become evident in many western capitalist countries from the late 1970s. This conception rests on three different fundamental determinants: a) the decline of parliament, b) the strengthening of the Executive and, c) the political role assumed by state administration (Poulantzas, 2000: 217). Although Poulantzas makes these classifications considering primarily the western capitalism, one can easily observe that these facts have become very common ingredients at the Periphery too. These facts have suggested some explanatory arguments for many countries’ reform and transformation processes besides Turkey such as former Socialists like Poland and Czech Republic or East-Asian “Tigers” etc. In this respect, we can find more evidences from Turkish experience with neoliberalism that verified Poulantzas’ projections. From the mid-1980s to the present day, whatever their ideological or programmatic differences are, all the governments without any exceptions gave the special priority to privatizations of State Economic Enterprises (SEE) and the commodification of, for instance, the health and education services. In general terms, a kind of competition has been going through among the selected governments to “*withdraw the state from the economy*”. That is to say, at that point to be against social state policies, the willpower of the parliament is being revealed in the same neoliberal direction. Despite all ideological and programmatic differences, the Turkish governments have been carrying out neoliberal policies successfully for more than twenty years. I think it has become apparent what Poulantzas referred while saying “fall of the parliament” within the Turkish case.

Hence, we are confronted with the fact that de-politization of the economic has become one of the most striking features of the capitalist society and its institutions. It is in this respect, the notion of de-politization of the economic emphasizes some practices that restrict the affects of the “traditional” administrative bodies on economic policies (Güveloğlu, 2005: 18). In this manner, the issues of the economic management, especially in some key sectors, directly have been transferred to the autonomous bodies which have been created already. These are simply called the “regulatory boards”. It is noteworthy that within the separation of the economic and the political, the latter has expressed a negative notation. The concepts of corruption, degeneration, cronyism etc. were conceived as a part of the political acts. Almost the last two decades of Turkish liberalization experience gives us the best arguments about this *dichotomy*. The multilevel policies, which include all the steps that should be taken, offered in the adjustment programs on the road to the membership of the European Union, and all the contractual or official texts about conditional credits taken from IMF and the World Bank impose Turkish governments to create that kind of autonomous bodies in order to prevent the economy management from the “deadly” influences of the politics.

Obviously, the logic of these “regulatory boards” does not fit with the convenient perceptions on the sovereignty of the nation-state. The point is that the concept of sovereignty has transformed into another thing. In other words, nation-states as the basic units of all politics are no longer provide a meaningful framework to explain the essence of today’s world politics. In attempting to understand the logic of globalization, it is necessary to understand particularly the main aspects of that shifts occurred in traditional perceptions on the state. According to Scholte (2004), during the period between mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, the territorial bureaucratic centralized states reigned

supreme over the vast majority of humanity including through state-based colonial empires. Sovereign state supplied rules to govern every aspect of social relations: money, language, armed violence, sexual behavior, employment, formal education, health standards, heritage, nature conservancy etc. As he further puts it:

World politics in this statist era was very much on international (or, to be more precise, inter-state) system. Provincial and municipal authorities had no trans-state relations. Supra-state regionalism did not exist apart from international river commissions. (...) The situation fell very much into what international relations theorists have typically called 'Westphalian' mould, after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia that formulized the modern concept of a system of sovereign states (Scholte, 2004).

From that point of view it seems that globalization led the radical changes. First of all if we have defined globalization as a high degree of privatized inter-linkage among domestic systems, it is obviously different from the former one. For example, every sub-systems of nation-state, especially local authorities, have become a part of trans-state relations recently. These relations may comprise some economic issues i.e. credit agreements, exchange contracts etc. or some social policy co-operations. In this perspective, that new system can be defined in Wiener's words as "increased speed and volume of private trans-border transactions –especially in *economic* and *social* relations (particularly in capital and accumulation systems)- that leads to a qualitative transformation of economic and social geographies, or 'spaces' of economic and social interactions, for practical purposes, such relations are 'de-bordered'" (Wiener, 2001: 461). Surely, we should consider some other factors that support globalization process such as technological advances in telecommunication and transportation: computerized data transmissions, radio broadcasts, satellite remote sensing and internet etc. According to Scholte all of these concrete facts have made the world system as "polycentric".

From the alternative point of view, for instance, if globalization is defined as increasing mobility of trade and capital flows and the dominance of transnational corporations in global markets, as Hirst and Thompson put it there is nothing new about globalization. Although many of the economic and political factors can be listed to understand the global economy, Hirst and Thompson suggest that globalization is an exaggerated myth (1996: 2). Firstly, according to this point of view, current highly internationalized economy is not unprecedented:

...It is one of a number of distinct conjunctures or states of international economy that have existed since an economy based on modern industrial technology began to be generalized from the 1860s. In some respects, the current international economy is less open and integrated than the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 1914 (Hirst & Thompson, 1996: 2)

On the other hand, trans-national corporations have not become prevalent in the world economic system yet. Besides, one of the most important arguments of the defenders of globalization about the direction of capital flows did not realize, either. That is, contrary to conventional wisdom, capital moves systematically from the *periphery* towards the *center*. In other words, there is no any convergence occurred between the poor and the rich in global scale. Trade, investment and financial transactions still have been taking place within the Triad of Europe, Japan and United States. Thus, we can not talk about so "globalized" and "liberalized" complex structure that it is impossible to be dealt

with. In their analysis, Hirst and Thompson propose these facts: a) In both national and international levels, the nation-state will be playing a central role in economic governance, b) After that, the state is expected to work as a *less sovereign* entity and will participate more in management of international issues, c) State still has the key role to control and order the masses because the masses are less mobile than money, goods and services (1996: 3).

If we turn back to the issue of regulatory boards, we clearly see that, to some extent, the sovereignty or some functions of nation-state has been transferred to supranational, intergovernmental, transnational, non-governmental, sub-state and increasingly private marketized mechanisms through these autonomous boards. According to some social scientists “sovereignty is no longer exist” (Chopra and Weiss, 1992) and the Westphalian notion of sovereignty has become obsolete (Czempiel and Rosenau, 1989, 1992). But in spite of this, we can not propose that the fundamental functions of nation-states have disappeared. However as we shall see later in details, the nation-state system is still preeminent feature of the present world system. It means the state has a central role in the system but its functions have been renewed. To put it simply, we can say the end of the Westphalian system has not marked the end of state power².

3. LIBERALIZATION EXPERIENCE OF TURKEY: FROM “SEPTEMBER 12” AND “JANUARY 24” TO OZAL ADMINISTRATIONS

“Even a maître d’hôtel is being paid more than a General Staff Officer!”
-General Kenan Evren³

The Turkish economy starting from the late 1950s to late 70s was characterized by import-substitution, that is, inward-oriented capital accumulation model. That model, rest on state protectionism, ensured the secure grounds for domestic industry to grow up during two decades, and finally went into crisis in late 1970s. The main reflections of the crisis on economy were high inflation rates and the gap in foreign exchange reserves (Balkan & Yeldan, 1998; Boratav & Yeldan, 2002). Increasing dependence on imports of intermediate and final goods, deteriorating current account balance, negative interest rates, and political insolvency were the broad headlines of the last stage of the system in late 1970s (Demir, 2004: 852). On the other hand, that crisis was not peculiar to Turkey. In fact, the essence of crisis was the plugging of the capital accumulation regime and that was another symptom of eternal crisis of international capitalism. It is for this reason that, inward-oriented import substitution model was abandoned and Turkey shifted its economy policies to an outward-oriented development path. Turkey initiated its neoliberal reforms in 1980 with the liberalization of commodity trade and flexibilization of its labor markets. The capital account was de-regulated and financial liberalization was completed in 1989 (Cizre & Yeldan, 2005: 387). Hence, it can be said that when January 24 Decisions were providing an infrastructure required for the new accumulation model (Sönmez, 1986: 276), September 12 Military Coup was setting up the political and legal groundwork for the new path of accumulation (Savran, 2002: 15). Thus, the year 1980 suggests a corner-stone in

² According to Scholte (2004), all governments can shape the effects of globalization on their territories and populations with fiscal, money, consumer, labour, environmental and so on. On the other hand, some strong states, i.e. United States, can influence global and supra-territorial activities.

³ The leader of military junta General Evren was complaining about the social inequalities in Turkey on the first days of the military coup. Quoted by Savran (2002: 15).

the modern economic and political history of Turkey. After that not only economic but also political and ideological transformations took place to create “autonomous individuals” foreseen by both neo-classical economics and liberal-individualist state approaches (Yalman, 2002: 38).

It is noteworthy that after September 12, military administration was institutionalized strongly in Turkey’s political life and legitimated itself as *National Security Council*. The parliament and the civil government were abrogated and the Council revolved both legislative and administrative powers until the institutions of democracy were restored in 1983. According to Saybasili, in that period of time, the only specific field that was excluded by the “military state structure” was the economic field. “*In the meantime,*” states Saybasili, “*the ‘relationships’ with those organizations such as IMF, OECD and World Bank was handled in normal ways*” (1992: 176). Indeed, throughout the “first generation” neoliberal reforms, Turkey emerged as a test case for the newly implemented World Bank–IMF joint program involving cross-conditionality (Kirkpatrick & Onis, 1991)⁴. Following the major balance of payment crisis in the late 1970s, under the direction of international financial community, Turkey tried to undertake a profound transformation in the philosophy of state structure mainly concerning its role in economic affairs (Demir, 2004: 852). Notably, while the period between the years of 1980 and 1989 can be termed as Turkey’s first generation liberalization, the current stage of the neoliberal reforms can be termed as ‘second generation’ marketization reforms (Cizre & Yeldan, 2005: 388).

On the other hand, the most remarkable characteristic of the ‘structural adjustment’ episode in Turkey is the fact that, it coincided with the complete reorganization period of country’s political structure. It is for this reason that, the military coup expressed more than a shift occurred in the political regime. Indeed, it can be considered as a starting point for the transformation process of the state form. That transformation due to the changing characteristics of the balance of forces between social classes also reflects the change in the state itself as a field of power relations took place. In other word, the change in the form of state could be defined significant restructuring of the relations between state and civil society (Yalman, 2002: 38)⁵.

In the post-1980 era, the economy policies known as the “January 24 Decisions” included devaluation with a high rate, an increase in the SEE prices and removal of price and exchange rate controls. However, certain acts of the program, for instance, some including labour market arrangements, could be realized by only means of the non-economic factors i.e. military power. That is to say, the structural shifts from ISI regime to a free market model was realized under a military dictatorship between the years 1980-1983 imposed strict restrictions over labor union rights and labor’s bargaining power (Demir, 2004: 853). Nevertheless, the activities of the all labor unions and strikes were banned, the most important revolutionary body of the workers, DİSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions), was turned down and the leaders were trialed by the military courts. Finally, the contractual order was changed and many advantages created on behalf of the capitalists

⁴ In Demir’s words, “the program designed by these twin institutions aimed at stabilizing and liberalizing the closed, inward-oriented economic structure in Turkey and at shifting it an outward-oriented path of development. The World Bank and IMF were committed to present the Turkish experience as a model of success to the rest of the less-developed countries” (2004: 852)

⁵ The main goal of that specific ‘relations’ and the reorganization processes within the state, as Yalman has pointed out, was *to put an end to the class-based political perceptions*. In that sense, “Thereby appealing to the people, workers in particular, as individuals, while trying to discredit the trade union by labeling it as a wasted interest became the hallmarks of the day” (2002 : 41)

(Sonmez, 2003: 162). The whole picture manifests us the class characteristics of military coupe in just the same way as General Evren's expressions mentioned above. In this manner, may be the most concrete document expressed the historical function of the coupe is 1982 Constitution which revoked many of the democratic rights and freedoms granted by the 1961 Constitution. It is in this respect, the new labor laws enacted under the military regime deprive workers of even their most basic rights (Savran, 2002: 15).

In this period of time Ozal has applied the military administration's policies about wages and agricultural supports. In this episode, real wages fell down approximately 7 % –this number was equal the real wage level in year of 1963– and the wage rates for agricultural sector decreased about 17 % (Savran, 2002: 29)⁶. Financial instruments are rapidly varied in these years. Various kinds of investment instruments such as revenue sharing certificate and mutual funds, increased investment opportunities of the money holders (Sonmez, 2003: 166). These instruments caused the widespread using of credit cards and consumer loans, so controlling the financial system became harder. Beside these, the Stock Exchange Market has founded in 1986. Also the foundation of interbank money and foreign exchange markets and the formation of the Central Bank's legal conditions to use open market operations were the facts that appeared in this period. In 1984, wealth declaration application has abrogated with a decision in favor of companies. Thereafter, the tax income has been started to based on employees with payroll cut off and with the application of value added tax in 1985, on consumers.. By this way, the tax income to natural income rate has decreased in the country and there has been created a damaging environment for stabilization in favor of entrepreneurs (Oyan, 1989). Internal debt has become an important instrument in financing public deficits in this period and it was one of the facts that damages macroeconomic stabilization in following years. In financing the SEE system, the role of Treasury has been decreased rapidly and by this way for the enterprises such as PTT, TEK, Turkish Airlines, it was made easy to get internal and external debt. The reduced investments in these areas laid a groundwork for privatization through extreme internal and external debts. On the one hand, the principals of open economy were settled in external economic relations. Customs tariff and quotas, on the other hand, were almost removed. The "fictitious exports" supported by government itself through export incentives made way for serious moral hazard.. In this period, holding companies became dominant over the whole economy by their activities in some areas along with the manufacturing industry such as banking, insurance, construction, retail selling and foreign trade⁷.

4. REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION IN STATE: THE ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOURSE AND ARRANGEMENTS OF GOVERNANCE

Thereafter liberalizing the mobility of capital flows in 1989, during the following decade Turkey has faced chronic instability problem and three major financial crises in 1994, 1997 and 2001. Meanwhile, the economic policies that being applied since 1980s have rapidly increased internal and external debt stocks and caused public finance to be dependent on a group of speculators. Because of,

⁶ All of these arrangements not in favor of the labor could be seen as the revenge of "relative" freedom and gains of labor since 1960s.

⁷ For more detailed works on relations among state, business and bourgeoisie in Turkey, see Keyder (1987), Bugra (1994) and Sonmez (1986).

in Yeldan's words, "a degenerate populism" and the tendency of managing debts by means of the new loans, Turkey became rapidly the biggest debtor of IMF in 2001. As a matter of fact, this is not an abstract condition. Instead, it causes the debtor country to cope with a series of political and economic sanctions. That perspective suggests a meaningful framework for the present regulatory governance reforms.

i. From Transnational Arrangements to the Sub-State Systems: Multi-Dimensional Governance

In spite of the term governance being used rather frequently by the eminent parts of the politicians, bureaucrats, academicians and intellectuals in Turkey for more or less a decade, it is still difficult to understand for the masses that what the exact meaning of this quite "*unlikable*" and "*antipathetic*" word is. Nowadays, it can be said that both Turkey and some of the European countries –especially transition economies such as Poland and Czech Republic- have many commons at that point. Indeed, *governance* has become one of the national slogans in these countries' transformation and reform processes. Clearly, one of the most important reasons for uncertainty about the term mentioned above is that, almost every -macro and micro level- economic, politic, cultural and social issue has become closely relevant to the concept and discourse of governance. That is to say, it is not easy to put the term right in a unique context. Perhaps, this is also the main reason why such a paradigm called "multilevel governance" emerged in the western political science and public administration literature. For example, present global finance system which is ruled and controlled by the international finance sector, in other words, a very narrow group of international elites imposes the *global governance* and searches for and focuses on every opportunity so as to build a "new financial architecture". In this manner, functions and roles of multinational and multilateral political and financial institutions are being re-defined.

Moreover, as a result of that perspective, the concept of "national governance" has being used lately. For instance, Hirst and Thompson (1996: 121-151) outline the levels at which governance can operate, from that of the world economy to that of regional economy within nation states: First one is "governance of the world markets". That item emphasizes the governance issues through agreement between the major nation states (particularly the G3 -Europe, Japan and North America- to stabilize exchange rates, to coordinate fiscal and monetary policies, and to cooperate in limiting speculative short-term financial transactions), international regulatory agencies such as WTO or large economic areas by trade and investment blocs such as EU or NAFTA (1996: 121). The second level is the "national economic governance". The policies that "balance cooperation and competition between firms and the major social interests, producing economic coordination and assistance in providing key inputs such as R&D, the regulation of industrial finance, international marketing, etc., thereby enhancing national economic performance and promoting industries located in the national territory" (p.122). Third one is the "regional economic governance". It refers regional-level policies of providing collective services to industrial districts, augmenting their international competitiveness and providing a measure of protection against internal stocks (p.122). It has become apparent with this basic classification that the dominant characteristics of governance issues are its multilevel feature. As it is stated by many scholars, the concept of national governance refers a very broad literature which is

discussing the nation-state model, in other terms, the nation-state itself. This view underlines that the nation-state has a serious trouble with its governing capacity. In this perspective, the basic characteristics of new tendencies in public administration approaches being discussed at the first step (Weiss, 2000; Merrien, 1998; Pereira, 1997 and Olowu, 2002).

In attempting to understand the essence of present regulatory state reforms and related conceptions of the new world politics from the supra-national to national and then sub-national scales, it is necessary to focus particularly on the some connotations of the term governance which has already become widespread. That means governance shows no any significance by itself. Instead, it should be apprehended in the context of the neoliberal ideological hegemony⁸. Considering the other complementary words such as “globalization” and “privatizations”, the main target of this chapter can be expressed as to bring into the light those ideological aspects of discourse of governance. As a matter of fact, multilevel governance arrangements impose the similar policies and reforms on behalf of the monopoly capital all around the world.

ii. The Definitions of Multilevel Governance

From the public administration point of view there are two different popular definitions on governance. The first one, which is going to be used in this work, is the definition using by the World Bank, OECD, United Nations and some related global institutions such as UNDP. According to that view, governance is defined as *the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social development* (World Bank, 1994). Specifically, the term became evident in an earlier World Bank Report focusing on Africa in 1989. The Report has pointed out that the present heavily circumstances in Africa due to the bad governments and lack of (good) governance. In short, the Bank called this situation as “the governance crisis” (World Bank, 1989). A second approach defining governance, in Olowu's words, “focuses on the sharing of authority for public management between state and non-state organizations. Here, Jan Kooiman and other European researchers define socio-political forms of governing as *'forms in which public and private actors do not separately but in conjunction, together, in combination'* tackle social problems, through co-arrangements” (Olowu, 2002: 345). Elsewhere, Rosenau characterizes global governance as “systems of rule at all levels of human activity –from the family to the international organizations- in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions” (Rosenau, 1995: 15). On the other hand, an abstract analytical definition of governance may refer to “order plus intentionality (Rosenau, 1992: 5) or ‘ongoing collective action’ (Prakash & Hart, 1999: 2) or ‘interactions in which public as well as private actor participate’ (Kooiman, 2003: 4) or ‘authoritative allocation of resources and exercise of control and coordination (Rhodes, 1996: 625).

⁸ According to Cerny (2004), it is noteworthy that, “neoliberalism has always involved the privatization of many public and social services and experimentation with public-private productive and distributive goods. However the emphasis has shifted from the direct sale of government-controlled industries, as in the United Kingdom under the Thatcher Government, to ‘contracting out’ services, the development of public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the use of private sources of finance for public purposes”. That is to say, use of financial performance indicators and ex-post enforcements at the heart of the system. It also involves the development the hybrid forms of ‘governance’ around special-purpose bodies such as development agencies at local, sub-national-regional, transnational and international levels (Cerny, 2004). Accordingly, following Cerny, I conceive the concept of multilevel governance as a broad definition of privatization not restricted by the state-owned enterprises or any other public services. Instead, governance refers to the privatization of use of the public force as a whole.

From “global” to “national” scale, the forms of governance set forth some differences. That is, all the sub-systems consisting the nation-state have their own governance, in other words, they became governance structures themselves anymore. Some of them as follows: Education system (Higher Education Board), health, environment and city planning issues (Habitat-II and The Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment-EIA), macro-economic structure (IMF and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs-SAPs), management and corporate finance (corporate governance reforms), local administration (Local Agenda 21) and public sector issues (New Public Management Approach), industrial or labor relations (Lisbon Process), asset, service, money and capital markets (regulatory boards such as RTUK (Radio and Television Supreme Council), EPDK (Energy Market Regulatory Authority), BBK (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency), SPK (Capital Market Board of Turkey), Competition Board, Tobacco and Sugar Boards)⁹ etc. These are the main reflections of the new governance paradigm on our everyday lives. Nevertheless, in the works of well-known English social scientist Rhodes, it is possible to find various definitions of governance such as *corporate governance*, *good governance*, *new public management*, *new political economy*, *international interdependency*, *socio-cybernetic system* and the *networks*. In this manner, the corporate governance and good governance refers the processes of providing efficient auditing services and maintenance of transparency and revealing the knowledge for either governments or private sector. Besides, the *New Public Management* approach suggests increasing the efficiency of governmental and bureaucratic structures considering the principles of the private sector’s business administration (Rhodes, 2000: 345-363).

Since the beginning of the 1990’s and especially after the establishment of European Union in 1993, a new form of the “social policy” approach has become one of the most peculiar perceptions within the context of industrial relations in Europe. For example, the new strategy called *New European Employment Strategy* has appeared. That brand-new strategy projects the convergence of employment policies of member and candidate countries of Union and suggests the creation of new employment opportunities to eliminate the gender-gap and to overcome the sexual segregation and exclusion in European labor markets. In fact, that strategy has reached in success and in the short run, a lot of new job opportunities -mostly part-time, no advanced skills required and, of course, transitory jobs- being created. “Flexibility” is still the most striking feature of current period. Lastly, it is easy to determine all of these facts as a part of the European governance¹⁰.

5. FINANCIAL REGULATIONS IN BUILDING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Governance systems must promote transparency, accountability, responsibility and fairness –the very foundations over which our market system must grow... If investors are not confident with the level of disclosure, or if a country’s accounting and reporting standards are perceived as lax, fund will flow

⁹ Today, in Turkey the number of regulatory boards has reached 12, including those decision-making bodies that have not been established yet. These Boards ‘regulate’ and perform the ‘administrative policing’ of a large domain of sectors, including tobacco and energy markets, as well as matters relating to competition in private radio and television broadcasting. For the purpose of maximizing public interest, these independent committees have ‘bureaucratic-technical’ formations that exclude them from political influence. According to many elite ‘statesmen’ and politicians the most significant reform accomplished in public administration in Turkey over the last decade is the increase in the number of these boards and the expansion of their functions at the expense of the central government.

¹⁰ See, *Newsletter on European Governance*, No.13, European Commission, 2003. Also see Svensson (2000).

elsewhere. Thus the ability of the markets to raise capital is prejudiced (*Mark Mobius, Templeton Emerging Market Group*)¹¹

Global governance is an attempt to establish a novel agenda in world politics and has taken an important role on the 1990's global socio-economic and political agenda. For many theoreticians in the social, economic and political sciences, global governance is the crystallization point for a brand-new vocabulary about politics beyond the nation-state system (Friedrich, 2002). That is, evolution of the term is ongoing side by side in an attractive uncertainty with the concepts of "co-regulation", "co-production", "co-management" as such (Güler, 2003: 93-116). Clearly, those concepts with their common prefix "co-", emphasize on "*regulation, production and govern jointly and together.*" Additionally, the term governance has been used as a simple code referring *less or minimal state*. Arrangements such as cutting the government expenditures, reducing the number of public personnel, carrying out the public services by means of the private sector and the privatization policies are generally called *governance way of governing* (Stoker, 1998: 17-28; Merrien, 1998; Beeson, 2001).

Having discovered in mid-nineties that how important institutional elements during economic development processes are, international finance and credit institutions such as IMF, World Bank and OECD has started to attribute to the "institutional change" in their boundless/endless researches, projects and reports frequently. Again, the notion of institutional change has been regarded as an important part of the problem of, "re-construction of state" especially in the cases of many African and Eastern European countries. As Beeson (2001) puts it correctly, the notion of the "good governance" meant establishing market free of government interference. In this perspective "the state's role was simply to establish a secure legal and institutional environment in which markets could flourish and to do those things that markets could not" (2001: 485). To go into details, it can be said that the re-construction of state is not limited by only the distinct or specific areas and countries. That is, it does not seem just a local or restricted trend. In the period called globalization, due to the results of the changing characteristics of capitalist accumulation regimes of our time, the state as the most important institutionalized power structure on the earth has been forced to change entirely. In brief, this is quite global and historically familiar trend¹².

According to Overbeek (2004) global governance has become a buzzword since the early 1990s. In this manner, the both elements of concept *global* and *governance* are diffuse and elusive. Then, he took the term *global* as "of planetary dimension", "world-wide", "globe spanning" and the term *governance* considering its connotations with "regulation", "coordination" and "authoritative allocation of the values". Hence, the definition given by the *Commission on Global Governance* can be seen as the prototypical statement of global governance:

The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken (1995: 2)

¹¹ S. DUPLITO & C. JUNIA "Urgency of Corporate Sector Reforms Cited," *Business World Internet Edition* (30th May 2000). Quoted by Tolosa (2001)

¹² For instance, the World Bank's (1997) annual assessment of world development, subtitled *The State in a Changing World* clearly acknowledged this, suggesting that "East-Asian Miracle shows how government and the private sector can cooperate to achieve rapid growth and shared development." Quoted by Beeson (2001: 485)

In Maiguashca's (2003: 3-4) work, it can be found one of the best definitions of the concept of global governance. As it is stated here correctly, global governance conceived as "a complex array of systemic constraints that shape the actions of states, challenges the notion of international anarchy at the heart of realist formulations of international politics"¹³. In this perspective, global governance "raises a number of questions about the authority and legitimacy of the state and international institutions, the role of norms and norm-making, the possibility of democratic accountability, the nature of power and the meaning of citizenship" (Maiguashca, 2003: 5)¹⁴. Similarly, according to Senghaas (1993: 251) global governance has to be examined from three different perspectives. *"...firstly with regard to the globalization of international process and the resultant need for increased regulation; secondly the fragmentation process taking place in the world and the arrangements needed to mediate in the ensuing disputes; and thirdly, new conflict regulation mechanisms, including appropriate intervention procedures on the part of the world community"*.

6. THE RUSH OF GOVERNANCE IN TURKEY

Governance paradigm is quite meaningful and functional in the context of western capitalism. It is possible to understand governance as an attempt to find another way to overcome the chronic crisis of global capitalism. In this manner, we should, at first, consider the unequal economic and social relations between the Center and the Periphery. That is, accumulation and wealth transfers have been taking place towards the Center systematically. International trade and price ratios have been always realized for the benefit of multilateral corporations and capitalist metropolises. The poor countries are not only struggling desperately in a fatal debt trap but also keeping on financing the wealth of 'western' nations (Gelinias, 1998: 34). I think, that is exactly the point where the global and national governance arrangements meet.

Although it is beyond the aim and scope of this study, we should underline strongly that the development strategies rest on the foreign aids do not rely on the pure humane and ethic concerns or charity. Instead, such policies as foreign aid have been concerned one of the most profitable sectors. It has become such an industry that the debtors and creditors seek the most profitable opportunities for themselves. In fact, the notion of indebtedness not only refers the profitable investments but also provides to international elite the functional tools for re-structuring the world affairs. As a matter of fact, the concept of governance was stepped in at that moment. Along with the fiscal policies primarily aimed to make debt services sustainable and insisted on the cruel primary balance, governance imposes on the national governments some social, economic, political and legal reforms to obtain profitable and safe –especially in terms of property rights- institutional environment for the foreign

¹³ Of course, strong objections exist against these conceptualizations. For instance, John Keane called global governance system as Cosmocracy. As he states that *"...In discussions the system of global governance –or cosmocracy- the word 'system' commonly comes in for a battering (...) This so-called system seem to be one of anarchy; it seems that no institution or body regularly occupies the seats of power. It is as if there are no rules or regulations and nobody is in charge"* (2002: 70).

¹⁴ Since the beginning of 1990s a very broad literature has appeared on the concept of Global Governance. Some key documents can be listed as follows: Paul Diehl (Eds.), **The Politics of Global Governance** (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); J. Rosenau & O. Young (Eds.), **Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience** (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); U. Beck et.al., **Democracy and Global Order** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); D. Held & A. McGrew (Eds.), **Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance** (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999); A. Prakash & J. A. Hart (Eds.), **Globalization and Governance** (London: Routledge, 1999); R. Falk, **On Humane Global Governance** (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); M. Hewson & T.J. Sinclair (Eds.), **Approaches to Global Governance Theory** (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1999).

investors and capital inflows. In recent years, governance reforms have become on the other hand indispensable conditions for the credits and loans given by international financial institutions such as World Bank and the IMF (Bevir & Rhodes, 2001). Today, the most part of the populist governments and the degenerate leaders of under-developed world are generally dependent on the international finance system and act like sub-contractors of the global elites. Thus, the global network system not only rests on the advanced communication and transaction opportunities supported by the high technology but also through these local governments' functional roles. Those governments have been carrying out the policies on the benefit of global market players. The policies like deregulations, trade and financial liberalization, privatizations and public reforms implemented by those work together to find any finance opportunities for their budget deficits via easy money with a high costs. Because, international investors and market players, at the first place, declare clearly that the existence of such an advanced governance structure –that is, a deregulated, liberalized, privatized and reformed political, legal and institutional environment- that within a country's border is extremely *sine qua non*. Nevertheless, after the big debt crisis of early 1980s, the credit and debt opportunities of the under-developed countries have become relevant to some heavy conditions. The most credits and loans released by IMF and World Bank are laid structural adjustment reforms down as a condition for under-developed countries. Accordingly, the reforms have become blackmail about the credibility for the poor.

After the collapse of the East Asian Tigers, governance issues have become popular within the framework of international development policies. The vast number of working paper series and research projects are made and funded by international financial institutions like IMF and World Bank and the academia have been trying to find any correlation between the notion of economic development and institutional variables (Chang, 2002; Zabcı, 2002: 57; North, 2002 and North, 1992: 359-68). Therefore, the notion of good governance, as it is stated in previous sections, encompasses the institutions of democracy, transparent and efficient bureaucracy and adjudication, protection of the property rights¹⁵ and well-developed financial institutions (Chang, 2002: 70).

According to Guler, the term governance has been used very first time in Turkish literature at international Habitat-II Conference held in Istanbul in 1996. The main subject of the conference was “*to make the human settlement fair, sustainable and survival.*” Those three goals will be achieved by means of these three instruments: “*The consciousness of citizenship, strategy for to make it feasible and government with multi-actors.*” Among these instruments what governance is the one called “the government with multi-actors” (Guler, 2005: 152).

¹⁵ The concept of property rights has a central role in the discourse of good governance and it is also one of the favorite concepts of World Bank reports. These rights are vital for protecting private property and ensuring the secure and profitable institutional environment for international investments. In this manner, the existence of effective legal arrangements so as to protect property rights is necessary. In this respect, the quality of the property rights regime in a country is determined by the mature of some institutions such as company law, contracting law, bankruptcy law, heritage law and tax law (Merrien, 1998). In other words, it is easy to see that governance is not against the state as a whole. Instead, it aimed to refine solely the social characteristics of state that conceived as a ‘market barrier’. ‘Minimal state’ does not mean a weaker state on the contrary it has been rationalized within the marketization process. The governance way of state emphasizes a kind of ‘market friendly’ capitalist state (Zabcı, 2002: 163) In the World Bank’s terminology it can be said that the market friendly state encourages investors to make enough investment and provides competitive environment for private enterprises, opens up the economy to international transactions and obtains a stable macro economy.’

The style of political governance in Turkey has been transformed over the past decade as a result of various influences; namely, the impact of the 'democratization' process, development in the relationship with European Union (EU), and the decrease in content and frequency of conflicts caused by several groups; the sporadic occurrences of major natural disasters such as earthquakes and economic fluctuations. The political responses of voters, the NGOs, and the media to the afore-mentioned events have also put pressure on the government to change their styles. Moreover, the reformation of the state institutions has gained a new momentum with the implementation of the EU candidacy strategy devised in response to the decision made at Helsinki Summit in December 1999 and the Turkish National Program prepared accordingly. Transparency in political decision making and regulation was an initial effect of the steps taken in this regard (National Report on Sustainable Development, 2002: 103).

That passage above underlines some major issues in the context of Turkish national governance within the official institutions' terminology. Before starting to analyze that passage, I would like to make clear some points about the discourse of governance. First of all, that terminology does not belong to any single domestic government; that is, Turkish or any other. Especially, the World Bank and some international *think-tank* organizations have been using that *language*. These annoying texts have many common points. That is to say, the language of governance, on the other hand, reflects the de-nationalization of state strictly. The state issues, or in other words, executive processes have become de-nationalized not only because of the some dynamics of actual economic and political facts but also by means of those translation-based policy impositions. Another annoying feature of discourse of governance is based on its "salesman" strategy. That means, without an exception all the texts trying to explain the aptitudes of "governance mentality" employ the narcotic effects of the words. It is for this reason that a broad "critical" discursive analysis of governance should be done.

That's true. After the series of very deep financial crises (1994, 1997 and 2001), the inculcations made by international institutions such as IMF and World Bank on Turkey about the necessity of the radical reforms and regulations have become much stronger. The heavily conditions in the country have been used as a quite functional tool to legitimate the reforms while showing them as urgent requirements in the public opinion. In the framework of the cooperation with the World Bank and IMF, the governance arrangements can be mainly listed within the Turkish case as follows. All the steps taken to increase in transparency and to defeat the corruption, and reforms aimed to remove the political pressure on the tax system and public sector, the actions made for ensuring the budget transparency and high performance for the administration etc¹⁶. On the other hand, *National Program*, in brief, suggests that a) making a new public delegating law, b) creating private courts so as to promote the intellectual and private property rights, c) forming autonomous regulatory bodies and d) strengthening the other auditor institutions, and e) changing the laws on the state subsidies entirely

Additionally, the 57th Turkish Government's¹⁷ *The Transition Program to Strong Economy* (TPSE) could be seen merely as an extension on the Turkish economy of international commitments given by Turkey. This program, particularly, includes both financial and public reforms and projects a new

¹⁶ After the financial crisis of 2001, the USD 18 billion rescue package for Turkey, which made the largest IMF debtor in 2001 until Brasil broke the record in 2002 with USD 30 billion, included governance conditionalities in addition to the usual ones that are of a macroeconomic nature. When the new stand-by agreement came into effect in May 2001, Turkey promised improved governance to the IMF in its letter of intent (Government of Turkey, 2001). Soon after, the Turkish government and the IMF had reached a stand-by agreement in spring 2001. Accordingly, in July 2001 and April 2002, the World Bank loans mentioned earlier were approved. See Ertürk (2003).

¹⁷ The 57th Government was a tripod. The partners of coalition were Democratic Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Motherland Party (ANAP). It can be said that the most striking feature of that power bloc was nationalism. Although their conservative and nationalist origins, the coalition coincides another phase within the Turkish experience of neoliberalism. It can be said that 57th Government has opened a new page with the new IMF-led adjustment package in December 1999 mentioned as the main cause of the big financial crash in 2001.

monetary policy bound to the floating exchange rate regime which is based on the price stability. In this way, “the monetary policy is, then, out of the fiscal policy trajectory.” Certainly, that is exactly what the IMF wants (OECD, 2002). The GEGP expressed clearly that the most essential goal of the government was to constitute a governance-style state formation in Turkey. The passage from TPSE below reflects one of the best definitions of the governance mentality;

We understood very well the significance of a productive and strong private sector to become powerful and respectful state in 21st Century and of a state that functioning as a social supporter and auditor to constitute reliable social market economy. The strong economy will be raised on the private sector working in a safety environment, an efficient state and a broad social solidarity (TPSE, 2001).

Finally, Justice and Development Party (AKP) has come to power as 58th Turkish Government in the end of 2002. AKP declared itself as reform government and ‘prepared’ a reform package covering on a broad range of issues and sectors. That package which is called “Urgent Action Plan” (UAP) revealed following the general elections in November 2002 could be conceived as the manifest that the new Party would carry on governance reforms in Turkey. UAP provided the ground for the reform policies of the new government. In this perspective, AKP administration exhibits certain continuity with the previous coalition administration. It has become apparent with the actions taken by AKP such as decreasing the number of State Ministries and some of the line ministries that the main target of AKP government is to reduce the central role of the prime ministry to a kind of secretariat (Guler, 2002). On the other hand, along with the legal reforms on the bureaucratic “barriers” –for instance in business licensing and in foreign investments, AKP government efforts to improve the investment climate of Turkey. In brief, during the period that has started with the *Transition Program to Strong Economy* up to present AKP government, Turkey has taken very important steps in order to constitute the governance-style market-friendly and efficient service-state.

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